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Abstract The purpose of this study is to examine the effect capital structure
has on the market performance of the companies listed on the Warsaw Stock
Exchange in Poland in 2000–2015 as well as to present the empirical evidence
of its significance using a panel data approach. The study was based on data
obtained from the annual financial statements contained in the Notoria database
and published on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. We used Tobin’s Q ratio and
the market value of equity to book value of equity (MBVR) as the measure of
corporate performance. When Tobin’s Q was modelled, the level of leverage
proved to be significant. It means that the company’s capital structure affects
its performance. The sign between both variables, LEVERAGE and Tobin’s
Q, is positive which is in line with trade-off theory. The dynamic panel data
modelling approach allowed the conclusion that, irrespective of the measure
selected (Tobin’s Q or the MBVR), the value of the measure depends positively
on its value in the previous year. It means that a high performance noted in a
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1 Introduction
Capital structure has been the subject of many studies in the field of corporate
finance and it is often associated with a company’s financing decisions. These
decisions affect a company’s ability to thrive in a competitive environment as
its ability to maximize shareholder value (Abor, 2005). Contemporary capital
structure theories have varied since the early works of Durand (1952), who
postulated that an “optimal” capital structure should contain the amount of
debt which maximizes the company’s total value. The Modigliani and Miller
irrelevance theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), on the other hand, provides
the foundation for the ongoing search for an optimal mix of equity and debt
which would maximize the company’s value. This concept has been developed
and modified resulting in new theories such as: The arbitrage theory, the
information asymmetry theory, the pecking order theory, the agency theory, the
trade off theory and the signalling theory. These theories suggest that capital
structure can have a major impact on corporate performance (Bandyopadhyay
and Barua, 2016).
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the effect capital structure
has on market performance in the companies listed on the Warsaw Stock
Exchange in Poland in 2000–2015 as well as to present the empirical evidence
of its significance by using a panel data approach. Additionally, we analysed the
influence of the explanatory determinants commonly used in the literature on
corporate performance: Growth opportunities, the company’s size and its asset
structure. Implementation of the aim and verification of the hypothesis required
application of econometric models. The study was based on data obtained from
the annual financial statements contained in the Notoria database and published
on theWarsaw Stock Exchange. Calculations were made using the Gretl v. 2018b
package, which was originally written by Allin Cottrell, Wake Forest University,
and which is
“ (...) a cross-platform software package for econometric analysis, written in the C
programming language. It is free, open-source software. You may redistribute it
and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPL) as
published by the Free Software Foundation.” (Cottrell and Lucchetti, 2019)
The paper is organized as follows: Subsequently to the introduction, the second
section, discussing the reviewed literature, is presented. The third section
presents the hypotheses. The fourth one describes the dataset, the methodology
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and the empirical models used to investigate how capital structure affects
corporate performance. The fifth section shows the empirical results, while the
sixth, the last one, concludes the paper.
2 Literature Overview
2.1 Conceptual Studies on Capital Structure
A very influential work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) introduces the capital
structure irrelevance theory which holds that the choice of a company’s capital
structure is irrelevant to its value. However, this theory was based on restrictive
assumptions, which do not correspond with reality. When these assumptions
are removed, then choice of capital structure becomes an important, value-
determining factor. After considering taxes in the analysis, Modigliani andMiller
(1963) proposed that companies use the debt, due to tax-deductible interest
payments, thus, increasing the value of the company. The benefit of paying
less taxes may encourage companies to contract more debt rather than other
external sources of finance. There are two kinds of costs associated with debt:
The bankruptcy costs and the agency costs. Bankruptcy is a mechanism which
allows the creditors to take over, when the decline in the value of assets triggers
a default. The agency costs refer to the costs generated as a result of a conflict of
interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Bankruptcy and agency costs constitute
the basis of the trade-off theory (Myers, 1977, 1984; Haugen and Senbet, 1978;
Fisher et al, 1989). Under its framework, a company must define a target debt to
equity ratio. It means, that an optimal capital structure exists which maximizes
the company’s value. This theory suggests that debt financing offers more
benefits for a company than equity financing. This advantage results from a tax
shield on the interest paid on debt. In turn, equity income is charged with tax.
A lot of recent capital structure theories investigate the structure of debt.
Optimal debt maturity was first analysed in trade-off models by Leland (1994).
He examined the term structure of yield spreads and found that a rise in
the interest rates will reduce the yield spreads of current debt issues. Dangl
and Zechner (2016) explored the effects debt maturity has on subsequent
dynamic adjustment of the capital structure. They indicated that long-term debt
maturities destroy the equity holders’ incentives to engage in future voluntary
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debt reductions. By contrast, short-term debt maturities serve as a commitment
to a lower leverage, in times when company profitability decreases. Optimal
debt maturity adjustments were also analysed by Brunnermeier and Oehmke
(2013) as well as He and Milbradt (2014).
An alternative to the trade-off theory is the pecking order theory. This concept
was introduced by Donaldson (1961), then confirmed by Ross (1977) as well as
Myers and Majluf (1984). In the same year, the theory was further developed
by Myers (1984). It is based on two assumptions. The first one states that
managers are better informed about their own company’s prospects than its
external investors. The second is that managers act in the best interests of the
existing shareholders. What is more, the pecking order theory predicts that
companies prefer to use internal financing when available and choose debt
over equity when external financing is required. In this way, the pecking order
theory explains why the most profitable companies have a low debt to equity
ratio. This is exactly the reason why they primarily prefer internal financing,
not because they have set a low debt to equity ratio. In turn, companies with
low profitability are more likely to benefit from debt, because they do not have
sufficient sources of internal financing.
2.2 Definition and Measurement of Corporate Performance
Corporate (firm) performance is an ambiguous term, interpreted and measured
differently. The firm performance is derived from organizational theory and
strategic management, so it needs to be distinguished from the broader construct
of organizational effectiveness. Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) offered a
scheme of three overlapping concentric circles, with the largest representing
the organizational effectiveness. This broadest domain includes the medium
circle, representing business performance, including the inner circle representing
financial performance (see Figure 1).
Santos and Brito (2012) refer to it as business or corporate performance, which
is a subset of the organizational effectiveness that covers the operational and the
financial outcomes. Performance measures are either financial or operational.
Financial performance can be expressed by the return on assets, the return on
equity or the market performance measures. Operational performance could be
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measured by a growth in the sales and a growth in the market share. It provides a
broad definition of performance and focuses on the factors that ultimately lead to
financial performance (Chakravarthy, 1986; Hoffer and Sandberg, 1987).
Domain of Financial and 
Operational Performance 
(Business Performance) 
Domain of Organizational 
Effectiveness 
Domain of Financial 
Performance
Figure 1:Circumscribing the domain of business performance (source: Venkatraman and Ramanujam
(1986)).
The corporate performance measures most commonly used are the return on
assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE). These accounting measures
represent the financial ratios on balance sheets and income statements and are
used in many studies (Rajan and Zaingales, 1995; Nawaz et al, 2011; Addae
et al, 2013;Gupta, 2015; Igbinosa, 2015). In this context, corporate performance
could be defined in terms of a return on assets and a return on equity.
Market performance measures are other measures of corporate performance,
i.e. the price per share to the earnings per share (P/E), the market value of
equity to the book value of equity (MBVR), and Tobin’s Q ratio. They have
been used by many researchers (Rajan and Zaingales, 1995; Demsetz and
Villalonga, 2001; Zeitun and Tian, 2007; Van Essen et al, 2015). In accordance
with Hax and Majluf (1984), we use Tobin’s Q ratio as a measure of corporate
performance in this study.
Tobin’s Q ratio is a ratio between the physical assets’ market value and its
replacement value. It was first introduced by Kaldor (1966) as a valuation ratio,
i.e. the relation of the shares’ market value to the capital employed by a company.
Brainard and Tobin (1968) state that the market valuation of the equity related
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to the replacement cost of the physical assets is the major determinant of a
new investment. It is stimulated when the capital is valued on the market as
higher than what it costs to produce it. Inversely, when the valuation of the
capital is less than its replacement cost, it is not recommended to invest. In
their subsequent research, Tobin and Brainard (1976) used the term the “q ratio”
for the first time and stated that it is a nexus between the financial markets
for goods and services.
A common practice in finance research is to calculate Tobin’s Q ratio, by
comparing the market value of equity plus the book value of debt with the book
value of equity and debt, since it is difficult to estimate the replacement cost of
a company’s asset value (see, e.g. Zeitun and Tian (2007)). The ratio could also
be calculated as a ratio of the market value of equity and the book value of debt
to the book value of assets.
2.3 Empirical Studies on Corporate Performance Modelling
Many economists focused their studies on the relationship between the capital
structure and a firm’s profitability, producing mixed results. Some of these
papers are shown in Table 1.
Bandyopadhyay and Barua (2016) examined the association between the
choice of capital structure and company performance. They investigated the
difference in the behaviour of firms under different macroeconomic scenarios.
Their results show that choice of capital structure as well as corporate perfor-
mance vary, depending on industry affiliation, group ownership and firm specific
factors as well as on the condition of the macroeconomic cycle.
Yinusa et al (2016) found that firm performance is statistically significantly
negatively related to the capital structure of firms. Moreover, past performance
of a firm impacts its capital structure. Based on this study, it is recommended that
the firms on emerging markets may need to improve their financial performance,
so they can optimize their capital structure decisions.
Foo et al (2015) examined the relationship between the capital structure and
the corporate performance of public, listed oil and gas companies in Malaysia.
Their findings show that capital structure is negatively related to a firm’s return
on equity, suggesting that an increase in the level of the firm’s debt would
negatively affect its shareholders’ return.
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Table 1: An overview of empirical studies.
Research Period Object of Research Factors Affecting Corporate
Performance
Research Method
Bandyopadhyay and Barua (2016)





method of moments (GMM)
Yinusa et al (2016)
1998 – 2012 115 companies listed
on the Nigerian Stock
Exchange
Growth opportunities, age of
a firm, size, asset structure,
profitability
Panel generalized method of
moments (GMM)
Foo et al (2015)
2003 – 2013 29 oil and gas
companies in Malaysia
Short-term debt to total
assets, long-term debt to
total assets, total debt to total
assets
Panel data regression method
Benerje and De (2014)
1999 – 2011 130 iron and steel
Indian companies
Risk, size, growth, debt
service capacity, dividend
pay-out, financial leverage,
degree of operating leverage,
firm’s age, size
Multiple-regression analysis
Margaritis and Psillaki (2010)










Zeitun and Tian (2007)








The regression model in the
form of the Random Effects
model for unbalanced panel
data
Berger and Di Patti (2006)




bank’s overall risk, market
and regulatory factors,




two-stage least squares (2SLS)
Source: Bandyopadhyay and Barua (2016); Yinusa et al (2016); Foo et al (2015); Benerje and De (2014);
Margaritis and Psillaki (2010); Zeitun and Tian (2007); Berger and Di Patti (2006).
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Benerje and De (2014) found that company size, its debt-servicing capacity
ratio and financial leverage play a major role in affecting financial performance
of companies in the iron and steel industry in India. During the pre-recession
period (2003–2004 to 2006–2007), they observed that the financial leverage
and the debt-servicing capacity ratio played a major role in the industry under
examination. In the post-recession period (2007–2008 to 2010–2011), company
size, its debt-servicing capacity ratio and its financial leverage had a significant
impact on the firm.
Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) investigated the relationship between capital
structure, ownership structure and firm performance, using a sample of French
manufacturing firms. The study supported the Jensen and Meckling (1976)
agency cost hypothesis. A higher leverage was found to improve performance,
in terms of efficiency, for the entire set of the data. They also documented
that alignment of the entrenchment agency effects of ownership concentration
vary across industries and across the concentration ratios. They reported that
more dispersed firms face higher agency costs. They also found that family
firms outperform non-family ones. The quantile regression used to estimate the
leverage model for testing the efficiency-risk and the franchise-value hypotheses
indicated that efficiency positively affected the leverage in the low to high
ranges of the leverage distribution. This provides support for the efficiency risk
hypothesis. This is in line with the findings of their previous research (Margaritis
and Psillaki, 2007).
Zeitun and Tian (2007) showed that a firm’s capital structure had a significantly
negative impact on its performance measures, both accounting-wise (ROA and
ROE) and in terms of the market measures (Tobin’s Q). They also found that
the level of short-term debt to total assets has a significantly positive effect on
the market performance measure. The Gulf Crisis (1990–1991) was found to
have a significant impact on Jordanian corporate performance.
Berger and Di Patti (2006) tested the agency-costs hypothesis, with relation
to the US banking industry. The authors used profit efficiency as an indicator of
firm performance, as to measure the agency costs and to employ a two-equation
structural model that also takes into account the reverse causality from firm
performance to capital structure. Their main findings are consistent with the
agency-costs hypothesis, i.e. a higher leverage or a lower equity capital ratio are
associated with higher profit efficiency in almost the entire range of the data
analysed. The effect is both economically and statistically significant.
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Our results (see Section 5) suggest that, in Poland, the capital structure of a
company affects its performance. The relationship between LEVERAGE and
Tobin’s Q is positive which is in line with the trade-off theory. It is in contrast
with most of the above-mentioned studies. Moreover, the results of these studies
indicate that the choice of capital structure varies, depending on the research
sample, for example, on the industry affiliation or on the firm-specific factors as
well as on the conditions underlying the economic development in the countries
analysed. These studies, for this reason, may not be applicable to Poland.
There is a lack of comprehensive research on corporate performance in Poland.
Studies concerning the relationship between the leverage and profitability mainly
constitute a part of research on the choice of capital structure. However, most
of those studies have at least two drawbacks, i.e. they incorporated a relatively
small number of explanatory variables and quite old data.
In their work on the determinants of capital structure, Campbell and Jerze-
mowska (2001) showed the negative relationship between profitability and debt.
Skowroński (2002) obtained similar findings. Mazur (2007) suggests that only
the firms lacking internal funds use more financing from debt. This is in line
with the data previously obtained in Poland. Further research (Hamrol and
Sieczko, 2006; Wilimowska and Wilimowski, 2010; Jędrzejczak-Gas, 2014)
also showed a negative correlation between the level of debt and profitabil-
ity. Contrary to previous research, Jerzemowska and Hajduk (2015) found
a positive relationship between the capital structure and profitability of the
trade-and-service companies listed on the WSE.
3 Hypotheses
The capital structure is one of the main factors that could influence corporate
performance. The concept of capital structure is mainly associated with the
amount of debt used by a company to finance its assets and is also known as
the financial leverage. Theories of capital structure suggest how it might be
correlated with profitability. Some of the theoretical predictions regarding this
effect are conflicting. Myers and Majluf (1984) propose a negative relationship,
since companies prefer to finance their activity using internal funds rather than
debt. A negative relation between capital structure and corporate performance
(profitability) was also found by Kester (1986); Rajan and Zaingales (1995);
Wiwattanakantang (1999); Chen and Strange (2005).
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According to Jensen (1986) there is a positive relation, if the market for corporate
control is effective and forces companies to commit to paying out cash by levering
up. The threat caused by failure to make debt-servicing payments serves as an
effective motivating force for such companies to become more efficient. If the
market for corporate control is ineffective, managers of profitable firms prefer to
avoid the disciplinary role of debt, which would lead to a negative correlation
between profitability and debt. Lewellen and Roden (1995) indicated that a
company’s total debt and profitability are positively related. Another study,
carried out by Hadlock and James (2002) based on a sample of 500 non-financial
US firms concluded that companies prefer financing by debt, because they
anticipate higher returns from a higher level of debt. Fama (1985) argues that
bank loans could lead to an increase in a company’s performance, because
it helps avoid the high information costs incurred in public debt offerings,
through issuance of bonds. Thus, the companies more reliant on bank loans are
expected to be more profitable. Generally, Majumdar and Sen (2010) indicated
that there is a positive relationship between profitability and company’s debt.
However, they surprisingly found that in terms of some more profitable firms,
bank loans have negative effects on profitability. This finding is in contrast
to the predictions of the information-cost perspective. It could be explained
by the specific institutional context of the Indian financial sector, where most
commercial banks are state-owned. Thus, the monitoring of firms by these banks
may not be as close as would have been in case if they were privately owned,
as it is argued by the agency cost theory. Based on this discussion, the first
hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H1 : A company’s capital structure affects its performance.
In this study, the capital structure is measured by the ratio of total debt to total
assets (LEVERAGE). We used book values for both variables. The assumptions
of the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory are often used to explain
the factors shaping the capital structure. These factors also could be used to
determine corporate performance. In this study, we use three firm variables that
are often used in the capital-structure literature: growth opportunities, the firm’s
size and the asset structure.
Growth opportunities are approximated by the past growth of sales
(GROWTH). Companies in the growth phase have a high performance ra-
tio. They are able to generate profit from their investments. Thus, a company’s
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growth opportunities are expected to be positively related to its performance.
As such, the second hypothesis states that:
H2 : Growth opportunities are expected to increase a company’s per-
formance.
The SIZE is the growth rate of the book value of a company’s assets. It is
calculated as a size of company’s assets of a given year minus the company’s
assets of a previous year divided by the size of the company’s assets from
the previous year. A company’s sustainability is in line with its size. Large
companies typically diversify their activities, so they have a low risk of losing
liquidity. It leads to a reduction of bankruptcy risk (Duliniec, 2015). Wagner
(1995) argues that large companies have more bargaining power. As a result,
a company becomes more profitable. Further research (Harvey et al, 2001)
showed that firm size is significantly and nonlinearly related to profitability.
It suggests that, although bigger companies are likely to experience higher
profitability, the growth of revenue is likely to slow down faster in larger firms.
Based on this discussion, a third hypothesis can be formulated:
H3 : There is a positive relationship between a company’s size and its
performance.
Asset structure is measured by asset tangibility (TANG), i.e. the ratio of the
fixed assets to the total assets. It refers to a company’s investments in tangible
assets. If these investments are effective, a company’s performance improves.
Ghosh (2008) states that the greater the asset tangibility, the lower the scope of
the informational asymmetries between the insiders and the outsiders. It allows
for a higher leverage, with a concomitant positive effect on profitability. This
relationship is U-shaped. It suggests that a greater increase in tangibility exerts
a positive effect on the profits. As such, the fourth hypothesis is as follows:
H4 : A company’s tangibility is expected to positively impact its per-
formance.
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4 Description of the Dataset and Methodology
The object of analysis are the companies continuously listed on the main
market of the Warsaw Stock Exchange during the period of 2000–2015. There
were 117 companies, including 6 from the WIG-20, 17 on the WIG-40, 22
from the WIG-80 and 72 not present in any of them. The WIG-20 index is
based on the value of portfolio, with shares in the 20 major and most liquid
companies on the Main Market of the WSE. The WIG-40 comprises 40 medium
size companies listed on the Main Market of the WSE. The WIG-80 index
comprises 80 smaller companies listed on the Main Market of the WSE. Out
of the above indicated companies, only companies from the non-financial
sector were included in this study. Companies from the financial sector were
excluded, due to the specificity of their activities significantly differing from
production, construction, service, etc. For this reason, financial statements of
these companies are different in form and so, they are not comparable with the
reports of non-financial companies. Therefore, 16 companies were excluded
from the sample. Additionally, companies that did not submit complete financial
statements were also rejected, i.e. 11 companies. Finally, 90 companies were
qualified for the study, i.e. 77 % of the pre-selected sample. The data constitutes a
balanced panel of 90 units in 15 periods. By the “balanced panel” we understand
a panel with full sets of data, i.e. that all information for every company is
available. In our case, we selected the companies that were continuously traded
on the Warsaw Stock Exchange during the years 2000 to 2015, so there are no
missing values in the time series.
With regard to the papers mentioned in Table 1 as well as in order to verify
the hypotheses, a dynamic panel data linear model is proposed:
yi,t = β0 + β1yi,t−1 +
4∑
j=1
αj xji,t + ζi,t (1)
where yi,t is the explained variable, represented by the value of Tobin’s Q ratio
or the MBVR for ith company in time t; yi,t−1 is the lagged value of yi,t ;
explanatory variables xji,t represent the factors affecting corporate performance,
in particular: LEVERAGE, GROWTH, SIZE, and TANG (described above);
β0, β1, α1, ..., α4 are the structural parameters, and ζi,t is the error term. Such
explanatory variables were pre-selected from those proposed in the literature,
based on data-mining and the correlations among them. The entire data set is
represented by yearly time series.
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In the first step of the empirical analysis, the stationarity of the panel series
have been tested. If the series are stationary, then they can be used directly in
the model. The dynamic panel data statistical model, given by Equation (1),
will be estimated using the pooled OLS method with robust standard errors
(Arellano, 1987). Then, the fixed effect models and random effect models will
be estimated. In order to select the best version of the model, three tests will be
applied. The null hypothesis of the joint significance test assumes that the pooled
model should be selected. The alternative hypothesis suggests to select the fixed
effects model. The second one, the Lagrange multiplier test by Breusch-Pagan,
in the null hypothesis assumes that the pooled model should be selected. The
alternative hypothesis suggests to select the random effects model. The last test,
the Hausman test, allows to test whether the random effects model is consistent
(= null hypothesis) or the fixed effects model is more adequate (= alternative
hypothesis). In the next step, we allowed to the U-shaped relationship between
the market performance and the tangibility, by introducing the squared value of
tangibility into the model. All calculations and estimations have been processed
using the Gretl package.
5 Empirical Results
In the first step of the empirical analysis, descriptive statistics are presented. It
can be noticed that distribution of all the variables analyzed is characterized by
skewness and exhibited excess kurtosis. This applies to both the dependent and
the explanatory variables further used in the models.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables.
Test Statistics
Mean Median Std. Dev. C. V. Skewness Ex Kurtosis
Tobin’s Q 3.7045 1.1411 41.1350 11.1040 36.3670 1356.00
MBVR 4.6626 1.1785 32.5980 6.9913 19.6570 590.28
LEVERAGE 1.5166 0.4068 39.7640 26.2190 37.8980 1434.50
GROWTH 0.0000 0.0372 0.0000 37.6650 37.9060 1434.90
SIZE 0.3648 0.0371 9.6466 26.4460 37.7760 1428.30
TANG 0.2669 0.2532 0.2010 0.7530 0.5422 −0.4743
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In the next stage, the stationarity of the two series being modelled was tested.
Five tests were used for the panel data. The null hypothesis assumes that the
series is the I(1) process, while the alternative one assumes that it is stationary.
Empirical probabilities were close to 0.000 in the all cases. All of the statistics
suggest rejection of the null hypotheses (Table 3). If a level of significance equal
to 0.05 is assumed for the analysis, consequently, both series can be treated as
stationary. The remaining variables also turned out to be stationary, assuming
the significance level of 0.05.
Table 3: Stationarity tests of the variables.
Test Statistics
Tobin’s Q MBVR LEVERAGE GROWTH SIZE TANG
Im−Pesaran−Shin −2.8148*** −3.1568*** −1.6561* −3.5382*** −3.7548*** −1.6624*
Choi Meta−Tests:
InverseChi−Square 374.998*** 392.689*** 190.7440 703.510*** 720.5510*** 194.3380
Inverse Nor-
mal Test
−7.9156*** −9.2377*** −1.4226* −18.1754*** −18.3323*** −1.4499*
Logit Test −8.3091*** −9.3189*** −1.4386* −19.8611*** −20.5285*** −1.4959*
Levin−Lin−Chu
Pooled ADF
−6.2170*** −26.6580*** −0.1100* −1.0716*** −1.0597*** −0.2322***
*, *** Statistically significant at the level of 0.1 and 0.01 respectively.
Then, correlation between the variables was tested. The 5 % critical value
(two-tailed) is 0.0517. Assuming, as above, the level of significance at 0.05,
only two correlations were statistically significant. The correlation between the
value of the Tobin’s Q series and the LEVERAGE, which indicates a positive
relationship between the measure of market performance, represented by the
Tobin’s Q ratio, and the ratio of the total debt to the total assets (Table 4). The
second correlation is between the Tobin’s Q and the MBVR.
Next, the dynamic panel data models were estimated. For comparison pur-
poses, estimations of the static versions of the models were presented. The
results are provided in Table 5. Using the diagnostic tests applied in the analysis
(the joint significance test, the Breusch-Pagan test and the Hausman test), the
best models were selected. It can be noticed that when the Tobin’s Q – the
market performance measure – was modelled, then the lagged value of this
measure as well as the level of the leverage were statistically significant. It
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confirms the advantage of the dynamic version of the model over the static one.
The results show that, if the value of Tobin’s Q in the previous year increased by
one unit, it results in an increase of its value in the present period, on average by
0.47 units, ceteris paribus. Also, an increase in the LEVERAGE by one unit,
leads to an increase of Tobin’s Q, on average by 1.02 units. With regard to the
models selected by the diagnostic tests, in the case of the dynamic models, the
fixed effects model was the best, while in the case of the static ones, the random
effects model was the best.
Table 4: Correlation coefficients of the indicators, 2000–2015.
Tobin’s Q MBVR LEVERAGE GROWTH SIZE TANG
Tobin’s Q 1 0.0530** 0.9859*** −0.0019 −0.0049 −0.0358
MBVR 1 −0.0035 −0.0032 −0.0019 −0.0014
LEVERAGE 1 −0.0010 −0.0041 −0.0360
GROWTH 1 −0.0008 0.0506*
SIZE 1 −0.0399
TANG 1
*, **, *** Statistically significant at the level of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.
Table 5:Estimates of the Tobin’s Q and theMBVR as well as statistics of the tests for all the companies
listed on the WSE in 2000–2015.
Variable Models of Tobin’s Q Models of MBVR
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
Constant 0.5984 1.9755*** 4.4917 4.7364***
Tobin’s Q(−1) 0.4698***
MBVR(−1) −0.0368
LEVERAGE 1.0208*** 1.0209*** 0.0000 −0.0030
GROWTH −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000
SIZE −0.0180*** −0.0003 −0.0092** −0.0066
TANG 1.2879 0.6792 1.5545 −0.2402
Joint Significance
Test
1.2266 # 4.9818 # 1.3882 # 1.4710 #
Breusch-Pagan Test 0.1568 419.541 # 2.3015 8.3875 #
Hausman Test 101.449 # 0.9744 131.639 # 0.2478
**, *** Statistically significant at the level of 0.05 and 0.01 respectively
# The null hypothesis of the particular test is rejected at the 0.05 significance level
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The high value of Tobin’s Q reflects a company’s high market valuation. A value
of the index above 1 means that the company’s capital is valued by the market
above its book value. It means that a high market performance is perceived as a
positive signal for creditors. This is the reason why capital structure affects its per-
formance positively. Such a relationship is in line with the trade-off theory.
A high performance in the previous year constitutes a basis for good results in
the following year. In other words, a company achieving high revenues has better
growth opportunities. This is why market valuation of such a firm is higher in
the following year, which is reflected by high market performance measures.
In order to see whether the value of the market performance measure depends
on the same factors, with regard to companies differing in size, the entire
sample was divided into subsamples. The first subsample (only 4 companies),
called “large companies”, contains a group of the companies included in the
market index of the twenty largest companies listed on the WSE, particularly
in the WIG-20 index. The second subsample is composed of 14 medium size
companies included in the WIG-40 index. The next subsample contains 21 small
companies from the WIG-80 index. The last group of 51 companies constitutes
a subsample called “the remaining companies”. It is worth to remember that
this group covers the large-, the medium- and the small-sized companies. It
needs to be emphasized that it is a very varied subsample. The results of the
estimates of the panel dynamic models describing the market performance
measured by Tobin’s Q ratio, for each subsample, are provided in Table 6. It can
be seen that in each case the pooled model seemed to be more appropriate (the
joint significance test and the Breusch-Pagan test). In each model, the lagged
value of Tobin’s Q was statistically significant, positively influencing the value
of its measure in the present time. It is interesting that, if the subsample of
the remaining companies is taken into account, the LEVERAGE positively
influences the market performance. This is in line with the static trade-off
theory. In turn, the structural parameter, being close to the company size, is
negative and statistically significant, which is a surprising result. The reason
for this may be the fact that these companies have some components within
the structure of the assets, which, in a short-term perspective, do not bring any
additional revenues, e.g. some long-term investments or stocks of raw materials
and supplies constituting a collateral, in the event of a sudden increase in the
demand or in the prices of the supplies and raw materials. Companies with a
high share of such assets in the total assets may exhibit low profitability, because
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a high level of non-production assets creates additional costs, which, in turn,
reduces profits. The negative relationship between the company’s size and its
profitability is in line with the pecking order theory.
Table 6: Estimates of Tobin’s Q model and statistics of the tests for the groups of the companies listed
on the WSE in 2000–2015.




Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Constant 0.7822*** 5.8675 1.3500* −0.0214
Tobin’s Q(−1) 0.3591*** 0.4738*** 0.5827*** 0.7350***
LEVERAGE 0.2926 −4.0107 −0.5856 1.0193***
GROWTH −0.1507 −0.0061 −0.0818 0.0000
SIZE −0.0516 0.0115 0.4970 −0.0275***
TANG −0.2876 −4.8012 0.2572 0.1613
Joint Significance
Test
0.6131 1.2284 1.1219 0.040
Breusch-Pagan Test 1.0558 0.0661 0.5099 3.6388
*, *** Statistically significant at the level of 0.1 and 0.01 respectively
Table 7: Estimates of the MBVR model and statistics of the tests for the groups of the companies
listed on the WSE in 2000–2015.




Pooled Pooled Pooled Fixed effects
Constant 0.5786* 5.1709 −2.2919 1.3171
MBVR(−1) 0.4569*** 0.6319*** −0.0314 −0.0053
LEVERAGE 1.1405 0.0635 21.167 * 0.0001
GROWTH −0.1467 −0.0033 −0.4413 −0.0000
SIZE −0.1364 −0.7583 7.7265 5.7219
TANG −0.7661 −6.0129 −1.7679 −0.0140
Joint Significance
Test
0.9769 1.0144 0.9884 1.8163 #
Breusch-Pagan Test 0.8444 0.7549 0.2415 6.3984 #
Hausman Test na 12.1444 # 21.511 # 97.3674 #
*, *** Statistically significant at the level of 0.1 and 0.01 respectively
# The null hypothesis of the particular test is rejected at the 0.05 significance level
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Furthermore, the market performance measured by the MBVR was modelled
with respect to each subsample. The results are presented in Table 7. In nearly
all cases, the best model selected, based on the joint significance test, the
Breusch-Pagan test, and the Hausman test, was the pooled model. Unfortunately,
only for the large-sized companies and for the medium-sized ones the statistical
significance of the lagged variable was found. The positive value of the structural
parameter estimated suggests that the current-year value of the MBVR results
from an increase in the value of this variable in the previous year.
Table 8: Estimates of the Tobin’s Q and the MBVR without the leverage as well as statistics of the
tests for all the companies listed on the WSE in 2000–2015.
Variable Models of Tobin’s Q Models of MBVR













GROWTH 0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000
SIZE −0.0486 −0.0256 −0.0450 −0.0221 −0.0092 −0.0069 −0.0096 −0.0076
TANG −7.4628 −7.3671 1.5541 −0.1938
TANG^2 −7.0146 −7.1139 −1.8535 −2.9867
Joint Signifi-
cance Test
0.9882 1.0836 0.9985 1.0946 1.3894 # 1.4723 # 1.3872 # 1.4709 #
Breusch-
Pagan Test
0.3309 0.2109 0.0146 0.2772 2.3078 8.4034 # 2.2785 8.3562 #
Hausman
Test
2.0849 0.4439 2.1917 0.4671 131.656 # 0.0486 131.445 # 0.0343
*, **, *** Statistically significant at the level of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively
# The null hypothesis of the particular test is rejected at the 0.05 significance level
As it has been indicated above, the value of the LEVERAGE is highly positively
correlated with Tobin’s Q ratio. It is mainly due to the construction of both
measures. To avoid high collinearity, the LEVERAGE variable was omitted. As
already mentioned, according to the theory, the relationship between market
performance and tangibility is U-shaped. To include such a relationship in the
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model, a squared value of tangibility was created (TANG^2). Estimation of a
model with the variables TANG, TANG^2 considered jointly and separately,
was proposed, in order to select the model that best describes the dependent
variable’s evolution. The results of the estimations are presented in Table 8.
Again, the best models were selected based on three diagnostic tests (the joint
significance test, the Breusch-Pagan test, and the Hausman test), which are
presented in the table. It can be noticed that this modification does not change
the conclusions regarding the significance of the relationships between the
variables. Only the lagged exogenous variables were statistically significant at
the significance level of 0.05. It confirms the advantage of the dynamic model
over the static one.
6 Conclusions
On the basis of the empirical analysis, in the case of market performance, only
the first hypothesis stated in the paper can be confirmed. When Tobin’s Q
was modelled, the level of the LEVERAGE proved to be significant. It means
that a company’s capital structure affects its performance. The sign between
both variables, LEVERAGE and Tobin’s Q, is positive, which is in line with
the trade-off theory. It means that a company’s high market performance is
perceived as a positive signal for creditors.
The dynamic panel data modelling allowed the conclusion that, irrespective
of the measure selected (Tobin’s Q or the MBVR), the value of this measure
is positively dependent on its value in the previous year. It means that high
performance in the previous year constitutes a basis for good results in the
following year. In other words, a company that achieves high revenues has better
growth opportunities. This explains why the market valuation of such a firm
is higher in the following year, as reflected by the high market performance
measures. The remaining hypotheses, i.e.
H2 : growth opportunities are expected to increase a company’s per-
formance,
H3 : there is a positive relationship between a company’s size and its
performance and
H4 : a company’s tangibility is expected to positively impact its per-
formance
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need to be rejected. When subsamples of companies were analysed, pooled
models were selected. It means that the companies did not differ specifically in
terms of the level of Tobin’s Q and MBVR. Generally, it was not possible to find
significant explanatory variables in the models, except for the lagged variables
(a company’s capital structure, growth opportunities, size of the company and a
company’s tangibility were statistically insignificant). Only Tobin’s Q model for
the subsample of the remaining companies showed two significant elements –
leverage and company size. The negative relationship between these variables
is a surprising result. The reason for this may be the fact that large companies
demand larger loans and larger payables, which are harder to obtain.
It should be remembered, that the study only involved selected variables and the
research only covered listed companies, due to the availability of statistical data.
Therefore, the results of the study cannot be generalized to other enterprises.
References
Abor J (2005) The Effect of Capital Structure on Profitability: An Empirical Analysis
of Listed Firms in Ghana. The Journal of Risk Finance 6(5):438–445. DOI: 10.1108/
15265940510633505.
Addae A, Nyarko-Baasi M, Hughes D (2013) The Effects of Capital Structure on
Profitability of Listed Firms in Ghana. European Journal of Business and Man-
agement 5(31):215–229. URL: https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.
php/EJBM/article/view/9490.
Arellano M (1987) Computing Robust Standard Errors for Within-groups Estimators.
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 49(4):431–434. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-
0084.1987.mp49004006.x
BandyopadhyayA, BaruaN (2016) Factors DeterminingCapital Structure andCorporate
Performance in India: Studying the Business Cycle Effects. The Quarterly Review of
Economics and Finance 61:160–172. DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2016.01.004.
Benerje A, De A (2014) Determinants of Corporate Financial Performance Relating to
Capital Structure Decisions in Indian Iron and Steel Industry: An Empirical Study.
Paradigm 18(1):35–50. DOI: 10.1177/0971890714540365.
Berger A, Di Patti E (2006) Capital Structure and Firm Performance: A New Approach
to Testing Agency Theory and an Application to the Banking Industry. Journal of
Banking & Finance 30(4):1065–1102. DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.05.015.
Brainard W, Tobin J (1968) Pitfalls in Financial Model Building. The American
Economic Review 58(2):99–122.
Market Performance and Capital Structure of the Companies ... 21
Brunnermeier M, Oehmke M (2013) The Maturity Rat Race. Journal of Fi-
nance 68(2):483–521. DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12005.
Campbell K, Jerzemowska M (2001) Capital Structure Decisions Made by Companies
in a Transitional Economy. In: Financial Management, Objectives – Organisation
– Tools, Zarzecki D (ed), Zarzecki D (ed). Fundacja Rozwoju Rachunkowości w
Polsce, Warszawa, pp. 51–76.
Chakravarthy B (1986) Measuring Strategic Performance. Strategic Management
Journal 7:437–458. DOI: 10.1002/smj.4250070505.
Chen J, Strange R (2005) The Determinants of Capital Structure: Evidence from
Chinese Listed Companies. Economic Change and Restructuring 38:11–35, Kluwer
Academic Publishers. DOI: 10.1007/s10644-005-4521-7.
Cottrell A, Lucchetti R (2019) Gnu Regression, Econometrics and Time-series Library:
gretl. URL: http://gretl.sourceforge.net/. Wake Forest University, Uni-
versità Politecnica delle Marche.
Dangl T, Zechner J (2016) Debt Maturity and the Dynamics of Leverage.
URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=890228.
Demsetz H, Villalonga B (2001) Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance.
Journal of Corporate Finance 7:209–233. DOI: 10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00020-7.
Donaldson G (1961) Corporate Debt Capacity: A Study of Corporate Debt Policy
and the Determinants of Corporate Debt Capacity. Division of Research, Harvard
Graduate School of Business Administration, Boston.
Duliniec A (2015) Wybór źródeł finansowania a optymalna struktura kapitału
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